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The congruency sequence effect (CSE) describes the finding that congruency effects
in classic probes of selective attention (like the Stroop, Simon, and flanker tasks) are
smaller following an incongruent than following a congruent trial. The past two decades
have generated a large literature on determinants and boundary conditions for the CSE
and similar, congruency-proportion based modulations of congruency effects. A prolonged
and heated theoretical discussion has been guided primarily by a historically motivated
dichotomy between “top-down control” versus “associative bottom-up” explanations
for these effects. In the present article, I attempt to integrate and contextualize the
major empirical findings in this field by arguing that CSEs (and related effects) are best
understood as reflecting a composite of multiple levels of learning that differ in their level of
abstraction. Specifically, learning does not only involve the trial-by-trial encoding, binding,
and cued retrieval of specific stimulus–response associations, but also of more abstract
trial features. Moreover, these more abstract trial or event features can be both external,
such as the spatial and temporal context in which a stimulus occurs, as well as internal,
like the experience of difficulty, and the attentional control settings that were employed in
dealing with the stimulus. From this perspective, top-down control and bottom-up priming
processes work in concert rather than in opposition. They represent different levels of
abstraction in the same learning scheme and they serve a single, common goal: forming
memory ensembles that will facilitate fast and appropriate responding to recurring stimuli
or events in the environment.
Keywords: cognitive control, feature integration, memory, attention, congruency sequence effect, proportion
congruent effect, conflict adaptation, contingency learning
INTRODUCTION
Tests of the effectiveness of controlled attention typically require
participants to produce a response to a task-relevant stimulus
feature (target information) in the presence of task-irrelevant
stimulus features (distracter information), which can be either
congruent or incongruent with the former. For instance, in the
classic color-naming Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991),
subjects have to indicate the ink color of written color-words
(e.g., RED) while ignoring the word-meaning. The relative suc-
cess (or failure) of attentional filtering is gauged by contrasting
performance on trials where the distracter is congruent (e.g., the
word RED written in red ink) with those where it is incongruent
(e.g., the word RED written in blue ink) with the target, and
may therefore interfere with target processing unless it is effec-
tively ignored. The canonical finding is a marked congruency
effect: responses are slower and more error-prone to incongruent
compared to congruent stimuli, suggesting imperfect attentional
selection. Importantly, the size of the congruency effect, and by
implication, the effectiveness of attentional filtering, has been
shown to be malleable by a variety of factors, such as the frequency
of incongruent stimulus occurrences (Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979),
the explicit cueing of forthcoming congruency (Gratton et al.,
1992), and the congruency of the previous trial (Gratton et al.,
1992). The latter refers to the so-called congruency sequence
effect (CSE), the finding that the influence of distracters on the
processing of target information is typically dampened on trials
that follow an incongruent trial compared to those that follow a
congruent trial (Figure 1A; for reviews, see Egner, 2007; Duthoo
et al., 2014a).
Over the past two decades, the CSE has garnered much atten-
tion in the Cognitive Psychology and Neuroscience literatures,
with a central debate focusing on rival explanations for this
phenomenon, which are typically grouped into two major cate-
gories, “top-down control-based” versus “bottom-up associative”
accounts (see, e.g., Gratton et al., 1992; Botvinick et al., 2001;
Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004; Blais et al., 2007; Egner,
2008; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009; Hazeltine et al., 2011;
Schmidt, 2013). In the present hypothesis article, I attempt to
provide an integrative perspective on these accounts, as well as
related phenomena of contextual modulations of congruency
effects. Put simply, I will argue that the different accounts of
these effects’ origins ultimately describe complementary learning
processes operating at different levels of abstraction but driven
by a common principle and goal: the matching of incoming
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FIGURE 1 | Different interpretations of first-order sequence effects in
conflict tasks. (A) Hypothetical data plotted and labeled as a congruency
sequence effect (CSE), where response time (RT) varies as a function of
an interaction between previous trial congruency and current trial
congruency. Con, congruent; Inc, incongruent; Prev, previous trial. (B) The
same data as in (A), plotted in line with the feature integration account,
whereby the data pattern represents two additive effects of congruency
and feature repetitions. Complete, complete feature repetitions or
complete feature alternations from previous trial; Partial, partial feature
repetitions from previous trial. (C) The same data and plotting as in (A),
but relabeled in line with the interpretation of the contingency learning
account, where the data are explained as an interaction between previous
trial and current trial contingency effects. LC, low-contingency trials; HC,
high-contingency trials.
stimulation (external states) to memories (internal states) in the
service of producing fast, goal-conducive action. At the most
concrete level, the organism binds together co-occurring physical
stimulus and response features, whereas at a more abstract level,
we associate complex contextual cues with generalizable control
states. I will first provide a brief overview of some rival CSE
accounts and the empirical status quo, followed by the main
argument for viewing distinct sources of CSEs as describing
different, co-occurring levels of a broader learning process aimed
at optimizing stimulus processing and action selection.
A SELECTIVE COMPENDIUM OF CSE ACCOUNTS
CONTROL-BASED PERSPECTIVES
In line with the standard interpretation of congruency effects
as reflecting a measure of attentional selectivity, the original
observation of the CSE was interpreted as the expression of an
adjustment in attentional strategy (Gratton et al., 1992). More
specifically, Gratton et al. (1992) reasoned that encountering a
congruent or incongruent trial would engender an expectation
for the forthcoming trial to be of the same congruency (cf. Rem-
ington, 1969), which in turn would lead subjects to strategically
enhance (following incongruent trials) or decrease (following
congruent trials) their attentional focus on the target stimulus
feature, thus decreasing the influence of distracters (and, ergo, the
congruency effect) following an incongruent trial, and increasing
the influence of distracters (and, ergo, the congruency effect)
following a congruent trial.
About a decade later, a related, though much more formalized
(and influential), control-based account for the CSE was put
forward by Botvinick et al. (2001), who marshaled this effect as
evidence to support a “conflict-monitoring” model of cognitive
control. Briefly, these authors advanced an elegant computa-
tional scheme for a “homunculus-free” regulation of top-down
attention, positing that the cognitive apparatus detects internal
conflict between mutually incompatible stimulus or response
representations (e.g., the simultaneous urge to answer “red”
and “blue” when faced with the incongruent Stroop stimulus
described above), and uses the degree of conflict to produce com-
mensurate adjustments in top-down attention—the more conflict
is experienced, the more control will be applied. Thus, when
an incongruent stimulus is encountered, the processing conflict
caused by the incongruent distracters triggers an up-regulation of
attentional focus toward the target, which results in more efficient
attentional selection (and hence, a smaller congruency effect)
on the following trial; the opposite is true when encountering
a low-conflict, congruent trial, which results in a relaxation of
attention and, thus, less efficient attentional selection (and a
larger congruency effect) on the following trial. This particular
interpretation of the CSE is known as conflict adaptation.
While there are clear conceptual differences between the
expectation- and conflict-based accounts (see, e.g., Egner, 2007;
Egner et al., 2010; Duthoo et al., 2013; Jimenez and Mendez,
2013), for the present purpose they can both be considered
core members of the “control-based” model category, along with
various proposed refinements and extensions of the basic conflict-
monitoring proposal (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Egner, 2008; Hazel-
tine et al., 2011; Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012; Jiang et al., 2014).
First, these views commonly assume that the CSE results from
strategic adjustments in top-down attention or task-set. Second,
and more importantly, these accounts all operate at a level of
processing adjustment that is, in principle, independent of what
the specific stimulus features or responses are that will comprise
the subsequent trial. For instance, conflict- (or expectation-)
triggered enhanced attentional filtering in the Stroop task would
result in improved ink color selection regardless of the exact
nature of that color or the distracter word information in the
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upcoming trial. As will be discussed in more detail later on, this
“level of abstraction” of the mechanism that is held responsible
for the CSE, concerning either a generalizable cognitive state
(for instance, attentional focus) or specific stimulus or response
characteristics, represents the key distinguishing feature between
control-based and associative accounts of the CSE.
According to this criterion, we can also subsume under the
control-based category CSE accounts that focus on control adjust-
ments at the level of response selection rather than perceptual
attention. For instance, the “activation–suppression model” posits
a control mechanism that detects and suppresses response activa-
tion elicited by distracter stimuli, and assumes this mechanism
to work more effectively if it had been recently activated (i.e., by a
prior incongruent trial; e.g., Ridderinkhof, 2002; van den Wilden-
berg et al., 2010). Crucially, this model nevertheless assumes
that the process which is facilitated following an encounter with
an incongruent stimulus, namely the categorical suppression of
“distracter-route” responses, is independent of the specific fea-
tures of the subsequent stimulus. By contrast, certain “hybrid
accounts” that espouse the notion of conflict-enhanced control,
but link this mechanism to specific stimulus features (Blais et al.,
2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008; Blais and Verguts, 2012), defy
the present categorization scheme; these models will be discussed
in Section “A Multi-level Learning Perspective on the Modulation
of Congruency Effects.”
ASSOCIATIVE PERSPECTIVES
Associative accounts have proposed that the CSE may stem from
memory-driven effects, based on differing frequencies with which
specific stimulus and response features repeat over consecutive
trials for different congruency sequences (Mayr et al., 2003;
Hommel et al., 2004). For instance, Hommel et al.’s (2004) feature
integration account is grounded in prior work showing that the
specific stimulus and response features that co-occur on a given
trial of an alternative forced-choice (AFC) task (say, the word
RED in blue ink is responded to with a left button press in the
above-mentioned Stroop task) become bound together in episodic
memory as an “event file” (Hommel, 1998, 2004; cf. Treisman
and Gelade, 1980). Moreover, the subsequent re-occurrence of
any one of these features (e.g., the word RED) appears to trig-
ger the retrieval of the entire prior event file, presumably to
supply a potential shortcut to the correct response associated
with a previously seen stimulus (cf. Logan, 1988). This feature-
binding mechanism leads to a relative facilitation of processing
when all of the current trial features match the previous event
(complete repetitions; see also Pashler and Baylis, 1991; Mayr et al.,
2003), or when there is no feature overlap across successive trials
(complete alternations), relative to cases where some features are
repeated but others are not (partial repetitions), because in the
latter scenario, the retrieved event file has to be either discarded
or “unbound” in order for the currently presented stimulus to
be responded to correctly (Hommel, 1998, 2004; see also Neill,
1997).
By way of example, consider once more the Stroop task
alluded to earlier, consisting of a stimulus set of the words RED
and BLUE, printed in either red or blue ink, thus rendering a
total of two congruent and incongruent stimuli, and two pos-
sible responses. Here, congruent–congruent and incongruent–
incongruent trial sequences will consist entirely of complete fea-
ture repetitions or complete alternations (and thus, result in fast
responses), whereas congruent–incongruent and incongruent–
congruent trial sequences will consist entirely of partial feature
repetitions (thus resulting in slow responses). Hence, the CSE
data pattern of reduced congruency effects following an incon-
gruent trial compared to a congruent trial can be re-interpreted
as reflecting a basic congruency effect paired with a relative
handicapping of trials where partial feature repetitions impose
an “unbinding cost” on performance (Figure 1B; Hommel et al.,
2004). Evidently, in contrast to the control-based accounts, this
associative perspective requires no trial-by-trial adjustments of
selective attention to explain the CSE, and, importantly, the
proposed mechanism underlying this effect operates at the level
of specific stimulus features and responses.
Given that the feature integration account highlights poten-
tial associative confounds in the CSE that seem to be specif-
ically inherent to small stimulus and response sets, a natural
response to these concerns was a movement toward employing
conflict tasks with larger sets (typically, moving from 2-AFC to
4-AFC schemes), such that first-order repetitions of stimulus and
response features could be either prophylactically prevented from
occurring (e.g., Puccioni and Vallesi, 2012; Jimenez and Mendez,
2013), or removed from analysis after the fact (e.g., Ullsperger
et al., 2005; Akcay and Hazeltine, 2007). However, as recently
highlighted by several authors (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011;
Mordkoff, 2012), this trend may have introduced a new associa-
tive confound to the CSE, in the form of contingency learning.
Specifically, the expansion of the stimulus set (for instance, going
from two to four colors in the Stroop task) creates more possible
unique incongruent than congruent stimuli. When researchers
then present congruent and incongruent trials with the same
frequency (i.e., 50%), each congruent stimulus occurs more fre-
quently (and well above chance) than each incongruent stimulus,
which creates a contingency linking each distracter to their con-
gruent response (e.g., the word RED is most frequently paired
with the color red, and thus, the response “red”). Since high-
contingency (congruent) trials are responded to faster than low-
contingency (incongruent) trials, and consecutive trials with the
same contingency level appear to facilitate performance (Schmidt
and De Houwer, 2011), it is possible that the CSE in typical 4-
AFC tasks is a reflection of contingency-learning rather than of
control-based processing adjustments (Figure 1C).
At this point, it is worth to already highlight an overarch-
ing commonality between the “control-based” and “associative”
mechanisms that have been proposed as explanations of the CSE,
namely that they share the same ultimate purpose: the reason
for (i.e., the evolutionary selection for) binding together stimulus
features and actions is of course that this will facilitate fast and
appropriate responding to recurring stimuli (in a world where
recurring stimuli and events are the norm). In other words, the
organism creates memories and tries to match those memories
to external stimulation, such that previously experienced events
do not have to be processed “from scratch” like novel events. The
same basic purpose, but at a more abstract level, is served by the
putative control-based mechanisms noted above; they all describe
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an adaptation of processing strategies to previously experienced
(and likely recurring) events, which serves the goal of being
prepared for similar challenges in the future—another instance
of matching memories (here, of control states) to external stimu-
lation in order to facilitate fast and accurate responses.
THE EMPIRICAL STATUS QUO
The empirical evaluation of control-based and associative sources
of the CSE has produced a substantial literature over the last
decade, the nuances of which are discussed elsewhere in much
greater detail than I aim to provide here (e.g., Egner, 2007; Hazel-
tine et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2013; Duthoo et al., 2014a; Weissman
et al., 2014); instead, the present section summarizes what I
consider to be the key take-home messages of that literature.
First, there is little doubt that the nature of overlap in stimulus
and response features over successive trials can profoundly affect
performance (Hommel, 1998) and it is impossible to circumvent
the confounding factor of differential feature overlap between
different congruency sequences in the CSE when employing small
stimulus sets (e.g., only two or three different target and distracter
stimuli). It is therefore possible, or even likely, that CSEs observed
in studies with such small stimulus sets are partly, predominantly,
or entirely driven by feature integration effects (e.g., Mayr et al.,
2003; Hommel et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Notebaert
et al., 2006).
Second, while the movement toward employing larger stimu-
lus sets has resulted in a number of studies reporting CSEs in the
absence of feature repetitions (e.g., Ullsperger et al., 2005; Akcay
and Hazeltine, 2007, 2011; Hazeltine et al., 2011), almost all of
these studies appear to be open to alternative interpretation based
on possible contingency-learning confounds because of above-
chance occurrence of congruent stimuli (see Schmidt, 2013).
Similarly, 2-AFC studies that require subjects to categorize large
sets of unique stimuli (e.g., classifying face stimuli according
to gender) have produced CSEs in the absence of any stimulus
feature repetitions (e.g., Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Egner et al.,
2008, 2010; Lee and Cho, 2013), but they have been criticized as
being vulnerable to possible feature integration effects operating
at the level of semantic categories (like “male” and “female”)
rather than specific stimulus features (Schmidt, 2013; but see
Jiang et al., 2014).
Third, however, a substantial crop of recent papers with
designs that specifically control for both feature integration and
contingency learning confounds have in fact reported robust
CSEs (Kunde and Wuhr, 2006; Freitas and Clark, 2014; Hengstler
et al., 2014; Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt and Weissman, 2014;
Weissman et al., 2014; but see Mayr et al., 2003; Jimenez and
Mendez, 2013). A typical design of this recent wave of studies
circumvents both stimulus and response feature repetitions, as
well as contingency-learning confounds, by splitting a 4-AFC task
into two alternating 2-AFC tasks with non-overlapping stimulus
and response sets (e.g., presenting alternately Stroop stimuli that
are made up either of red/blue or of green/yellow combinations;
e.g., Schmidt and Weissman, 2014). This approach has produced
robust evidence for the basic presence of a “memory confound-
free” CSE, though in and of itself this does of course not tell us
what other, possibly control-based, mechanism is mediating these
effects. Current studies are starting to address this question by
exploring the precise boundary conditions for obtaining a CSE
under these constraints (e.g., Kim and Cho, 2014; Weissman et al.,
2014).
For the present purpose, the key conclusion is that there
is solid evidence that CSEs can be produced both by sources
that operate at a feature-specific level, driven by (re-)occurrences
of particular physical stimulus and response characteristics, as
well as by sources that must operate at a more abstract level,
producing CSEs in a manner that is independent of repetitions of
specific stimulus and response characteristics. How these distinct
contributors to the CSE may be conceptualized most fruitfully
within a single framework is the subject of the following section.
A MULTI-LEVEL LEARNING PERSPECTIVE ON THE
MODULATION OF CONGRUENCY EFFECTS
MEMORY (OBVIOUSLY) FORMS THE BASIS OF ALL SEQUENCE EFFECTS
First, it is worth emphasizing a point that perhaps seems self-
evident, but which has often been lost sight of in the long-running
debates over different possible causes for the CSE. That point is
that any time that a past experience (e.g., encountering an incon-
gruent trial) affects current performance, we are, by definition,
dealing with an expression of memory (or learning). This is true
regardless of whether the effect be mediated by some kind of
“passive carry-over” of within-trial conflict-resolution dynamics
(see, e.g., Egner et al., 2010; van den Wildenberg et al., 2012),
or whether the prior trial served to explicitly engender expecta-
tions regarding the forthcoming congruency level (e.g., Gratton
et al., 1992), or any other previously articulated “control-based”
mechanism; at the end of the day, these are all means by which
past experience changes current behavior, and are thus instances
of memory. Unsurprisingly, therefore, whenever researchers have
gone to the effort of constructing formal computational models
of the CSE, these were grounded in a reinforcement learning
algorithm (Botvinick et al., 2001; Blais et al., 2007; Verguts and
Notebaert, 2008), where experienced conflict essentially acts as a
teaching signal for updating the manner in which forthcoming
stimuli will be processed (cf. Jiang et al., 2014). Hence, the
basic dichotomy implied in labeling CSE accounts “control-” or
“attention-based” versus “associative” or “memory-based” can be
misleading. Rather than asking, “is it memory or is it attention?”
we must ask: “what type of learning processes contribute to the
CSE?”
To this end, as has already been alluded to in previous sec-
tions, I submit that a useful re-conceptualization of the tradi-
tional dichotomy between control-based and associative accounts
should not focus on the juxtaposition of attention versus memory,
but on the level of abstraction at which memory or learning effects
are being expressed. The feature-integration and contingency-
learning accounts deal with learning that links together con-
crete trial characteristics, namely, particular stimulus features
(and perhaps categories) and responses; by contrast, the control-
based accounts are concerned with learning aspects of a trial
that transcend the physical specifics of the stimuli or responses,
dealing instead with more abstract properties, like congruency,
experienced conflict, and/or the cognitive mechanisms that were
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FIGURE 2 | Concrete and abstract features associated with an event or
episode file pertaining to a trial on the color-naming Stroop task. The
features portrayed here (and possible additional ones) are proposed to be
bound together into an “episode file” that will be retrieved when cued by
matching features in future trials on the task.
recruited for dealing with the latter (Figure 2). As concluded in
the brief review of the empirical literature above, there is little
doubt that both concrete- and abstract-level learning processes
take place and that they are each able to produce CSEs in their own
right (as well as presumably contributing to CSEs simultaneously
when tasks are not designed to isolate them). Two pertinent ques-
tions, then, are what exactly the abstract trial characteristics might
be that are being learned, and how we should best conceptualize
the relationship between the different levels of learning.
WHAT KIND OF LEARNING MEDIATES CONCRETE-FEATURE
INDEPENDENT CSEs?
The “associative” accounts of the CSE explain this effect as a
consequence of the binding between concrete stimulus features
and responses, which shapes the future processing of similar
events. In the absence of concrete feature overlap or biased
stimulus–response contingencies, what is it that might be learned
or remembered from trial-to-trial that would produce a “control-
based” CSE? While the answer is presently not certain, the empir-
ical literature allows us to impose some bounds on possible
candidates. First, we can likely reject the notion of a very general
effect, whereby exposure to an incongruent trial would lead to
broad performance benefits regardless of the specifics of the task-
demands on the forthcoming trial. This rejection is based on a
large number of studies that have documented the CSE to be
domain- or conflict-specific (e.g., Wendt et al., 2006; Egner et al.,
2007; Boy et al., 2010; Funes et al., 2010; Akcay and Hazeltine,
2011; Schlaghecken et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Kunde et al.,
2012; for reviews, see Egner, 2008; Braem et al., 2014). Such
conflict-specificity is most appropriately assessed in protocols that
combine factorially two distinct types of conflict into a single
task, such that the independence of conflicts (i.e., additive main
effects) and their potential sequential (in)-dependence can be
assessed simultaneously, and in the absence of potential task-
switching effects when alternating between conflicts in a non-
factorial design (for an extended discussion, see Egner, 2008).
For example, if one combines the Stroop and Simon tasks, by
presenting color-words to the left or right of a central fixation
and requiring subjects to respond to ink color using left and
right response buttons, one obtains additive Simon and Stroop
congruency effects (Simon and Berbaum, 1990; Kornblum, 1994;
Jiang and Egner, 2014) and conflict-specific CSEs: Stroop congru-
ency effects are reduced following a Stroop-incongruent stimulus,
but not following a Simon-incongruent stimulus, and vice versa
(Egner et al., 2007). As concluded in a recent, more extensive
review of this topic, in studies using designs that assessed the
conflict-specificity of CSEs in the absence of potentially con-
founding task-switch effects (cf. Egner, 2008) there is abundant
evidence for such specificity (Braem et al., 2014). Thus, much
evidence suggests that abstract learning contributions to the CSE
must operate at a relatively “local,” trial type-specific level rather
than at a global, highly generalizable level.
In this vein, two closely related “hybrid” models of the CSE,
alluded to earlier, have argued for a very local, stimulus-specific
learning process (Blais et al., 2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008;
see also Blais and Verguts, 2012). For instance, the “adaptation-
by-binding” model proposes that the occurrence of conflict trig-
gers an arousal response that enhances the association between
top-down attention (task demand units) and the currently acti-
vated input units, which would correspond to the specific stim-
ulus features of the present incongruent stimulus (Verguts and
Notebaert, 2008, 2009). The authors propose that this form of
“conflict-modulated Hebbian learning,” binding top-down atten-
tion to conflict-evoking stimuli1, can account both for the CSE
and a related phenomenon called the “item-specific proportion
congruent” (ISPC) effect (Jacoby et al., 2003), where congruency
effects are selectively reduced for specific task-irrelevant stimulus
features (e.g., the word RED) that are frequently presented as
part of incongruent stimuli. The adaptation-by-binding model
can indeed easily explain the ISPC effect as reflecting repeated
strengthening of connections between task demand units and
specific stimulus features (see also Blais et al., 2007). Explaining
the (non-specific) CSE, by contrast, is attributed to the model
assumption that input units for task-relevant features which are
not actually part of the current stimulus are also “slightly acti-
vated,” such that even non-present stimulus features are held to
be subject to conflict-modulated Hebbian learning (Verguts and
Notebaert, 2008).
However, this stimulus-specific learning approach appears to
be incapable of explaining conflict-specific CSEs in tasks where
two conflict types are combined in a factorial design, such that
the basic stimulus features do not actually differ between conflict
types (see Egner, 2008). Here, the adaptation-by-binding model
would predict generalizable benefits of conflict-enhanced binding
1Interestingly, there is in fact growing recent evidence that conflict (or its’
resolution) enhances long-term memory for task-relevant stimulus features
(target stimuli; Krebs et al., 2013; Mayr et al., 2014; Rosner et al., 2014).
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of attention to (especially task-relevant) stimulus features, regard-
less of which type of conflict elicited the putative arousal response
and binding process; this runs counter to empirical findings,
however, because even with identical task-relevant features (e.g.,
ink color), conflict-general CSEs are not observed in such studies
(Wendt et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2007; Boy et al., 2010; Akcay
and Hazeltine, 2011; Schlaghecken et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012;
Kunde et al., 2012). There are some studies showing CSEs to
selectively cross “conflict boundaries” when task-relevant features
are shared rather than distinct (e.g., Notebaert and Verguts,
2008), but in these studies, changes between conflict types also
represent switches between tasks, such that they cannot directly
speak to the conflict-specificity (or lack thereof) of CSEs (see
Egner, 2008). These types of findings do suggest, however, that
rendering different tasks more similar may promote the likelihood
of obtaining cross-task CSEs (Akcay and Hazeltine, 2008; for
additional discussion, see Braem et al., 2014). To return to the
adaptation-by-binding model though, by conceptualizing conflict
as strengthening attentional modulation of specific input units
(e.g., “red”; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008) rather than of the
general task-relevant processing pathway (e.g., “attend to color”),
it is also difficult to see how this item-based account can capture
other, non-specific effects, such as effects of proportion con-
gruency on completely novel or “unbiased” stimuli, which have
been demonstrated both in the domain of the ISPC effect (Bugg
et al., 2011) as well as in the related domains of “list-wide” (Bugg
and Chanani, 2011) and “context-specific” proportion congruent
(CSPC) effects (Crump et al., 2006; Crump and Milliken, 2009;
Heinemann et al., 2009; King et al., 2012), which are addressed
in more detail below. In sum, while I am sympathetic to the
idea of a learning process that directly associates top-down states
with bottom-up trial features (see below), accounts that focus on
binding attention only to concrete stimulus features (Blais et al.,
2007; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008) appear to be too narrow to
explain a wide array of relevant findings.
From this discussion, we can conclude that the level of
(abstract) learning that might mediate CSEs in the absence of
concrete feature memory effects can neither be so broad as to
cross conflict or task boundaries, nor so narrow as to prevent
generalization to novel or unbiased stimuli within the same
task or conflict type. As elaborated in the following sections,
a parsimonious level of learning therefore would consist of the
binding of task- (or conflict-) specific but feature-independent
top-down states (e.g., “attend to color,” or “suppress responses
to location”) to contextual cues, which can range from specific
stimulus features to temporal episodes.
EVENT FILES THAT BIND CONTROL TO CONTEXT
In order to appreciate the level of abstraction that in my view
best captures the type of learning that contributes to feature-
independent CSEs (and a range of similar effects), consider the
phenomenon of the CSPC effect (for a recent review, see Bugg and
Crump, 2012): for example, Crump and Milliken (2009) displayed
Stroop stimuli in two different locations, either at the top or
bottom of the screen, and unbeknownst to the subjects, the likeli-
hood of incongruent stimuli was high at one location and low at
the other (but 0.5 overall). Under this set-up, subjects displayed
smaller congruency effects in the location with a high incidence
of incongruent trials, suggesting they had learned (implicitly, as
it turns out) to associate the two spatial contexts with different
attentional requirements or settings. Most importantly, this effect
held even for unbiased “transfer” stimuli that had occurred with
equal frequency at the two locations. These and similar findings
in the context of the ISPC (Bugg et al., 2011), CSPC (Heinemann
et al., 2009; King et al., 2012), and “list-wide” proportion congru-
ent effects (Bugg and Chanani, 2011), are all pointing toward the
same conclusion: that generalizable (i.e., abstract) control states
can be bound to contextual cues (location, in the above example).
I argue here that the “control-based” CSE represents but one
particular instance of the workings of this fundamental associative
mechanism that binds external cues to internal states.
One simple and parsimonious way of thinking about the more
abstract levels of learning mediating CSEs, therefore, is to extend
the idea of event files to encompass not just the forming of associ-
ations between concrete stimulus and response features, but also
of more abstract, categorical stimulus features and, importantly,
the linking of these features with co-occurring internal cognitive
states, most pertinently, with the attentional or control state that
was being engaged during the processing of said stimulus event
(Figure 2). Note that while that control state may in fact be
elicited by, and serve the resolution of, “conflict,” the idea that
internal control settings are being bound to contextual cues is not
in any way dependent on conflict being a driving factor; it could
equally well be another representation of task difficulty or task
requirements that is being bound to, and retrieved in response to,
a contextual cue (e.g., Crump and Logan, 2010). In either case, a
subsequent cued retrieval of that event file, for example, by one
of the stimulus features, would not just prime other associated
physical stimulus and response features, but also the retrieval of
the associated top-down attentional set which, given its abstract
nature (for instance, “highly focused attention on ink color”), can
be generalized to novel or unbiased “transfer” items (for similar
arguments, see Spape and Hommel, 2008; Crump and Logan,
2010; Hazeltine et al., 2011; King et al., 2012). At the same time,
as noted in the discussion of conflict- and task-specificity of CSEs
above, the control states that are being incorporated into the event
file appear to be constrained in their generality, in that they reflect
the particular settings of the current task-set or control process.
Accordingly, for example, contextual cueing of the top-down
process involved in resolving Stroop conflict, thought to involve
primarily the biasing of stimulus processing stages (Kornblum
et al., 1990; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Egner et al., 2007), will be of
little use when faced with Simon conflict, which is thought to be
incurred and resolved at the response-selection stage (Kornblum
et al., 1990; Sturmer et al., 2002; Sturmer and Leuthold, 2003;
Egner et al., 2007; Shin et al., 2010), and vice versa.
TEMPORAL CONTEXT: MOVING FROM EVENTS TO EPISODES
It is easy to appreciate how this kind of mechanism could account
for “unbiased” ISPC and CSPC effects (e.g., Crump and Milliken,
2009; Bugg et al., 2011), where a stimulus or contextual fea-
ture, over repeated pairings, becomes associated with a task-
appropriate control state. It is less obvious, however, how such
context-control binding mechanism would account for a CSE in
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the absence of any concrete feature overlap (and thus, bottom-up
cue) across trials. What if there were no such matching cue or, put
another way, what would lead to an appropriate and generalizable
control state being engaged in anticipation of the arrival of a
stimulus? The answer brings us all the way back to the notion of
expectations or predictions which are inherent in both the Gratton
et al. (1992) and the Botvinick et al. (2001) explanations of
the CSE, but I will here attempt to integrate these ideas within
the same framework as the event files: specifically, in order to
explain generalizable control effects at the trial-by-trial level in
the absence of concrete feature repetition, a second conceptual
expansion of the event file scheme is required. In particular,
while “context” in the empirical studies cited above has been
operationalized in the limited terms of concrete stimulus features,
such as stimulus location or color, it is fruitful to abstract this
notion further, so as to include the concept of a temporal context,
meaning that the retrieval or priming of particular stimulus–
response links and/or control states can be based on a temporally
defined frame the organism believes itself to be in (e.g., Braver
and Barch, 2002; Koechlin et al., 2003). This suggestion essentially
equates to extending the discrete and instantaneous nature of an
“event file” to a more dynamic and extended form of an “episode
file,” which can encode and (upon retrieval) apply temporally
extended contingencies and task sets (akin to schemas). This
broader conception of context would allow for stimuli in the
spatial and/or temporal vicinity of the current focus of processing
to guide appropriate event/episode file retrieval.
Temporal context can be relatively local (informed primarily
by the most recent events) or global (based on a longer sequence
of events). In a laboratory setting, a global temporal contextual
cue would correspond to a particular task phase or block of trials
that is predictive of concrete (e.g., color) or abstract (e.g., congru-
ency) stimulus characteristics; “list-wide” proportion congruent
effects are one obvious case in point (e.g., Bugg and Chanani,
2011). In real life, episodic frames (e.g., “am I at my own house
or at my grandmother’s place?”) routinely determine the retrieval
of extended schemas that include appropriate control states (cf.
Miller and Cohen, 2001; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). By
contrast, the most local contextual cue corresponds to the most
recently sampled observation (i.e., the previous trial), which
serves to update the organism’s running estimate of the likely
nature of forthcoming events (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1998). Thus,
in the context of the CSE, encountering an incongruent trial sets a
context under which the subjective likelihood of a forthcoming
trial also being incongruent is enhanced, as is inherent in the
accounts of Gratton et al. (1992) and Botvinick et al. (2001).
Importantly, the degree to which a given event drives the updating
of the organism’s belief of the nature of its current temporal
context is conditional on the statistics of the environment. In
a fast-changing (volatile) environment, local temporal context
(e.g., the last trial) should be more influential, whereas in a
more stationary (stable) environment, a more global temporal
context (e.g., a block of trials) provides a more reliable cue for
forthcoming stimulation (Behrens et al., 2007). In line with this
proposition, it was recently shown that a model using a volatility-
modulated learning rate in its prediction of forthcoming task
demands could capture both the CSE as well as a simultaneous
proportion congruent effect2 in a Stroop-like task (Jiang et al.,
2014).
According to the current proposal, the local temporal context
will prime (or maintain) the activation of the control state (as well
as the lower-level stimulus and response features) that character-
ized the context-updating event (i.e., the previous trial). There-
fore, even in the absence of any physical feature overlap across
consecutive trials in a conflict task (say, moving from “RED in
blue” to “GREEN in yellow”), the temporal context cue provided
by an incongruent trial will facilitate the retrieval (or foster the
maintenance) of the control state or task-set associated with that
trial for a period of time, whose extent likely depends on the
temporal statistics of the task environment (Egner et al., 2010).
Note again that, as with the suggestion that internal control states
can be bound into event files, the idea that a temporal context cue
can determine the retrieval and temporary application of suitable
processing strategies is not wedded to any particular view of what
the exact trigger (e.g., conflict) or nature of the control state might
be, and it naturally extends beyond the confines of the CSE. Thus,
the same logic applies to all manner of local sequence effects, like
enhanced response inhibition following stop trials in the stop-
signal task (Bissett and Logan, 2012), or the proposal that subjects
might adjust decision or response thresholds to resemble response
times on a previous trial (Schmidt, 2013). These are all instances
of the broader category of associations between temporal context
and internal processing strategies.
CREATURES OF HABIT: THE PAST IS (MOST OFTEN) THE FUTURE
Colloquially speaking, the role of temporal context cues as
described above corresponds to fostering “expectations,” and the
notion of the previous trial setting a local temporal context cue
could be equated to the idea of “repetition expectancy” (Grat-
ton et al., 1992; Egner, 2007); i.e., subjects, either explicitly or
implicitly, expect forthcoming stimulation to resemble that of the
recent past. The empirical literature on the role of expectations
in the context of the CSE at first blush appears somewhat mixed,
in part because the question of whether participants inherently
expect successive trials to be similar is easily confused with the
(orthogonal) question of whether manipulating expectations for
congruent or incongruent trials can modulate congruency effects
(e.g., Gratton et al., 1992; Aarts and Roelofs, 2011). Studies that
manipulated expectancies by varying the relative probability of
encountering different trial type transitions (congruency repeti-
tions versus changes) have sometimes observed a modulation of
the CSE by expectations (Duthoo et al., 2013, 2014b; Jimenez and
Mendez, 2014) and sometimes not (Duthoo and Notebaert, 2012;
Jimenez and Mendez, 2013, 2014). Importantly, though, a lack
of expectation effects in these studies was essentially expressed
as a failure to override the apparent default tendency to adapt
to the previous trial type, i.e., of repetition expectancy (Duthoo
and Notebaert, 2012; Jimenez and Mendez, 2013, 2014). In line
2The findings of Jiang et al. (2014) also highlight the fact that observing
additive effects of proportion congruent and previous trial congruency factors
on performance does not necessarily imply that two independent processes
are involved in bringing about these effects (e.g., Torres-Quesada et al., 2014).
Both of these (additive) effects can be produced by a single mechanism that
adapts its learning rate to the task environment.
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with these findings, when participants are probed explicitly about
their expectations of the forthcoming congruency, they exhibit
a reliable bias toward expecting the present congruency type to
be repeated (Duthoo et al., 2013; for equivalent findings in the
domain of task-switching, see Duthoo et al., 2012). In sum, it can
be argued that there is in fact consistent evidence for an inherent
default setting whereby the organism expects a high degree of
short-term autocorrelation (stability) in the environment—a con-
tinuity bias, which here is expressed in the form of an expectation
for the congruency (or difficulty, etc.) of the next trial to resemble
that of the previous one.
In line with the assumption of repetition expectancy, a per-
vasive bias for ongoing perception and decision-making to be
strongly conditioned by (serially dependent on) the recent past
has been well-documented by a number of elegant recent psy-
chophysical studies (Cheadle et al., 2014; Fischer and Whitney,
2014). The idea that, on a moment-by-moment basis, we tend
to (implicitly) assume that the immediate future resembles the
immediate past, should in fact be unsurprising, as our cognitive
apparatus is the result of evolutionary adaptation to a sensory
world of high temporal autocorrelation: in the wild, what we
see at one moment is a highly reliable predictor (combined
with efference copy signals of eye-movements and other motor
acts) of the visual input for the next moment (e.g., Dong and
Atick, 1995). A particularly efficient way of capitalizing on this
fact is to retrieve episodic memories that resemble the present
situation, and which therefore allow us to predict the unfolding
events ahead of time (for excellent, more extensive treatments of
such a “memory-prediction” scheme, see Hawkins and Blakeslee,
2004; Clark, 2013). Anticipating our environment, through the
use of episodic contextual cues, allows us to match, as closely
as possible, previous experiences to incoming stimulation, and
thus to optimize the nature and speed of our responses to our
surroundings. As I highlighted above, this represents the shared
purpose of low-level and high-level binding processes that link
stimuli and contexts to suitable internal states and actions.
SUMMARY
To summarize, the present proposal attempts to integrate dis-
tinct “associative” and “control-based” perspectives on the CSE
(and related phenomena), by arguing that in the bigger picture
these accounts can all be seen as describing complementary
levels of learning with a shared goal; specifically, learning to
link external stimulation to appropriate internal states (including
appropriate action selection). At the most concrete level, this
corresponds to associating physical stimulus features with spe-
cific motor responses; at a higher level of abstraction it involves
binding contextual cues (including temporal frames) to internal
attentional states and processing strategies (e.g., task sets). The
encoding of an event into memory thus incorporates not only
the associative binding of concrete stimulus features and actions,
but also of concurrent internal states (including control settings),
as well as more abstract external features that create a situa-
tional context (location, background, etc.), including an episodic
context that places the present experience within a temporally
extended reference frame. Translated back to the example of trial
sequences in the Stroop task, participants continually encode
(or rather, update) memories of event ensembles. As assumed
by the feature integration and contingency learning perspectives,
these ensembles include associations between concrete, physical
stimulus and response features (e.g., “RED,” “blue ink,” “left
index finger response”), as well as more abstract stimulus fea-
tures (e.g., the categorization of the stimulus as “incongruent”
or “difficult”). Importantly, these event ensembles furthermore
incorporate contextual information, like stimulus location, both
in the spatial and temporal reference frames, and all of these
“external” event features become associated with the internal
processing states that are engaged when dealing with the stimuli in
question, like task- or conflict-specific top-down biasing strategies
(e.g., “attend to color”)3. Retrieval of these internal states, along
with the lower-level aspects of each episode file, is triggered by
the encounter or prediction of event ensembles of (complete or
partial) matching contextual cues, again ranging from physical
stimulus characteristics to temporal context.
In this scheme, stimulus–response, categorical, and context-
control associations can all occur simultaneously, though the
degree to which any type of association is acquired and retrieved
to drive task performance will naturally be determined in large
part by the statistical structure of the task environment. An attrac-
tive proposal in this regard is that the cognitive apparatus is a
“miser,” attempting to produce appropriate action while exerting
the least mental effort possible (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Kool et al.,
2010). (This is of course also the point of forming stimulus–
response and context-control links). The brain will therefore
exploit correlational task structure any way it can (e.g., Melara and
Algom, 2003): if we encounter cues that predict responses directly,
we use them to bypass more complex and energetically expen-
sive processing (e.g., in task designs that allow for contingency-
learning), thus enhancing speed and saving effort. If stimulus–
response learning is rendered impractical but there are cues that
predict, for example, trial difficulty, then we use those cues to
adapt top-down control settings to task demands. In other words,
the acquisition and retrieval of context-control associations may
represent something of a “last resort” for the organism (Bugg,
2014). In line with this proposition, it has been shown in pro-
portion congruent manipulations in the Stroop task that when
item-specific stimulus–response linkages are relatively frequent or
salient, no “list-wide” effects of control are observed (Bugg et al.,
2008; Blais and Bunge, 2010), but when direct stimulus–response
learning is rendered less efficient, a list-wide control effect can be
seen to emerge (Bugg and Chanani, 2011).
OUTLOOK
More formal, empirical and simulation-based testing of the pre-
cise determinants of, and relationships between, the putative
different levels of learning that I have proposed here will hope-
fully prove a fruitful endeavor for future investigations. Some
particularly important lines of inquiry include the following:
first, as emphasized throughout the paper, we do not presently
3This proposal is compatible with the possibility that other internal states will
also become associated with the stimulus event, such as affective states, which
may bring with them the acquisition of avoidance learning (e.g., Dreisbach
and Fischer, 2012).
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know what exactly the more abstract trial properties or control
processes are that are putatively being incorporated into episodic
memory ensembles. Ongoing CSE research with experimental
protocols that avoid low-level memory effects so far appears to
point in the direction of a response-focused mechanism (Lee and
Cho, 2013; Weissman et al., 2014), but the jury is still out on a
definitive answer to this question. Secondly, the interplay between
the different levels of learning advocated here is presently not well
understood. In order to improve on this situation, researchers in
this area will need to move from viewing low-level memory effects
as “confounds” to incorporating independent manipulations of
trial feature repetitions at different levels of abstraction, such that
separate as well as potentially interactive contributions between,
say, physical feature repetitions and control state repetitions can
be assessed. A related question of great interest concerns the
manner in which the binding of concrete and abstract episode
features occurs at the level of neural mechanisms. The fast-
paced (trial-by-trial) CSE should likely involve the type of quick
episodic encoding (and retrieval) of trial features typically asso-
ciated with medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures, including
the hippocampus (e.g., Squire, 1992). An intriguing possibility,
based on extant literature, is that as the binding process moves
from more concrete (physical stimulus) features to more abstract
(e.g., attentional state) features, the interaction between the MTL
and cortical regions may shift along a posterior to anterior
gradient—specifically, interactions with posterior ventral visual
stream regions (and motor cortex) for concrete features (e.g.,
Kühn et al., 2011), the anterior temporal lobe stream for cate-
gorical stimulus features (e.g., Kensinger et al., 2003), and lateral
prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex in the binding of
control-level features (e.g., Egner and Hirsch, 2005; King et al.,
2012). A thorough examination of the mechanisms underlying
multi-level learning effects that transcend the traditional sep-
aration of associative versus control-based cognitive processing
should make for an exciting and highly important future avenue
of research.
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